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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, sitting en banc, dismissed an appeal of a preliminary injunction entered
against the operator of a video newsclipping service.' Noting that the district
court had entered a permanent injunction during the pendency of the appeal, the
court concluded that consideration of the preliminary injunction would be
inappropriate as the validity of the permanent injunction was not then before
it.2 In doing so, the court rendered moot one of the more remarkable-if short-
lived-copyright law opinions to emerge in recent years and certainly the most
notable since the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.3
This opinion, entered earlier by a three judge Eleventh Circuit panel in
Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services,4 would have dramatically
altered the scope and protection available to television news broadcasts. Prior
to the panel's decision, courts had summarily held television newscasts to be
entitled to copyright protection as compilations5 and that the scope of this
protection could extend to future news broadcasts not presently created. 6 The
panel's decision, however, undermined this premise by directly challenging the
* Winner, 1992 Nathan Burham Memorial Competition (The Ohio State University
College of Law).
1 Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Servs., 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992) (en
bane).
2 Id. at 188.
3 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); see infra notes 61-89 and accompanying text.
4 940 F.2d 1471 (lth Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir.
1991) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
For purposes of this article, the Eleventh Circuit panel's reversal of the district court's
injunction will be referred to as "the panel decision."
5 See Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1493-94 (11th Cir. 1984)
("Editorial judgment makes a news presentation-which consists of self-contained news
stories originating outside the studio, linked together by live commentary-an original work
of authorship entitling it to copyright protection."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985), on
remand, 618 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aft'd, 792 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1986); see
also International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918); KCNC-TV v.
Broadcast Info. Servs., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Colo. 1988).
6 See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co.,744 F.2d at 1499 n.17; Georgia Television v. TV News
Clips of Atlanta, 718 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
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capacity of district courts to enter injunctive relief against the taping of news
programs not yet created and, at the same time, indirectly questioning the
copyright status of news broadcasts. Although the panel's opinion represented
the first decision to challenge either seriously, it also was the first decision to
address the nature and the extent of the protection that copyright law affords to
a compilation after Feist.
This article analyzes the Eleventh Circuit panel's opinion in terms of
present day copyright law and the significance of the panel's reasoning to
copyright law's treatment of compilations. Part II of this article describes basic
copyright principles and the statutory basis for copyright protection. Part III
specifically addresses copyright law's factual treatment of compilations. This
section explains the split of authority that existed between the circuits before
1991 with respect to extending copyright protection to factual compilations.
Part Ill concludes with a comprehensive review of the Supreme Court's
decision in Feist, which resolved the conflict in the circuits and clarified the
extent to which copyright protection is available to owners of compilations.
Parts IV, V, and VI address the Cable News Network panel's decision
itself. After setting forth the facts and summarizing the issues presented in the
case, Part IV analyzes the panel's holdings and its application of Feist, with a
particular focus on the copyrightability of news broadcast compilations and the
proper scope of injunctive relief against the copying of those broadcasts. Part V
argues that, although the defendant's appeal was ultimately dismissed by the
full court on procedural grounds, the panel's decision was correct in its broad
application of Feist, and that Feist governs the scope of protection properly
afforded to factual compilations such as CNN's news broadcasts. Part VI
examines the nontraditional approach from which the panel's decision
addressed the conflict between the parties in the case and explains how this
approach departs from that taken by previous courts. This section argues that,
under Feist, future courts should adopt the panel's approach and analysis in
addressing copyright issues. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the
significance of the panel's decision.
II. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
A. Copyrightable Material
Article I, section 8, clause 8, the copyright clause of the United States
Constitution, grants Congress the power to enact copyright legislation "[t]o
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
[Vol. 53: 11551156
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Discoveries." 7 Under the current copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976,8
section 102(a) and 103(a) together specify the requirements for protection of all
types of works copyrightable under the Act, whether for literary and artistic
works under section 102(a),9 or for compilations t0 and derivative worksll
under section 103(a). Although both section 102 and section 103 works are
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act gives the
copyright owner the following rights:
1) to reproduce the work in copies;
2) to prepare derivative works;
3) to distribute the work in copies publicly;
4) to perform the work publicly; and
5) to display the work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). These rights are exclusive and appear to be subject only to the
limitations set forth in the sections following section 106 in Chapter One of the Copyright
Act.
Although article I, section 8, clause 8 refers only to "writings" courts have never
limited the scope of copyright to strictly written matter. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) ("writings" encompasses the literary
production of the authors).
8 Pursuant to the copyright clause, Congress adopted a copyright statute in 1790 and,
since that time, has substantially revised or rewritten the copyright law four times-in 1831,
1870, 1909, and 1976. The 1976 Copyright Act applies to works authored after January 1,
1978.
9 Under section 102(a), "works of authorship" include the following categories:
literary works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dramatic works,
including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound
recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). This list is "illustrative rather than exhaustive." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659
[hereinafter 1976 House Report].
10 See infra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
11 As defined in section 101:
A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Although both compilations and derivative works involve use of
preexisting materials, the distinction between the two is found in a compilation's use of
preexisting material or data, and a derivative work's use of preexisting works. This article
addresses only the copyrightability of compilations.
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entitled to copyright protection, the scope of protection provided by a section
103 copyright is more limited.
Section 102(a), stating the two fundamental conditions for copyright under
the 1976 Act, provides that "copyright protection subsists in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.. . from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with aid of a machine."'12 Accordingly, all works eligible for statutory
copyright protection must meet two fundamental criteria: (1) the work must be
entirely an original work of authorship; and (2) the work must be fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. 13
Specifically included in the category of "work of authorship" are section
103 compilations. 14 A compilation is defined as a "work formed by the
12 Id. § 102(a).
13 A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression,
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining "fixed"). According to the House Report
accompanying the Act:
It makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be,
whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or
symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device.
1976 House Report, supra note 9, at 52. The crucial element of this requirement is that
there is a physical embodiment of the work.
14 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). The relationship between section 102 and section 103 is
treated explicitly in the legislative history accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976, which
provides:
Section 103 complements section 102: A compilation or derivative work is
copyrightable if it represents an 'original work of authorship' and falls within one
or more of the categories listed in section 102. Read together, the two sections
make plain that the criteria of copyrightable subject matter stated in section 102
[i.e., fixation and originality] apply with full force to works that are entirely
original and to those containing preexisting material.
1976 House Report, supra note 9, at 57.
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collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship."'15 Thus, there are three necessary
conjunctive elements of a copyrightable compilation: "(1) a collection and
assembly of preexisting material, facts, or data (2) that are then selected,
coordinated, or arranged (3) into a work which by virtue of that may be said to
be as a whole an 'original work of authorship.'"16 The term "compilation"
additionally includes independently copyrightable works known as collective
works.17
As reflected in the definition, and in contrast to section 102 works, a
compilation is not a wholly original work and, consequently, is entitled only to
partial copyright protection. As set forth in section 103(b), "[Clopyright in a
compilation extends only to the material contributed by the author of such
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and
does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material."' 8 In other
words, copyright protection extends only to elements of a compiled work that
are original to the compilation author such as the selection, coordination, or
arrangement of the contents. The other elements of the work, the contents
themselves, receive no protection from the compilation copyright.' 9 Therefore,
the key concept is discerning the "material contributed by the author" as
opposed to the "preexisting material employed in the work." The author of a
compilation has an exclusive right in the former, but not the latter.20
15 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
16 WILLIAM PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 63-64 (6th ed. 1986).
17 As defined in section 101: "A 'collective work' is a work, such as a periodical,
issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate
and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988).
18 Id. § 103(b). This subsection further provides that the copyright in a compilation "is
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope... or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the preexisting material." Id.
19 The legislative history of the 1976 Act also supports the conclusion that Congress
intended to protect only the original contributions of a compiler. Both the House and Senate
reports indicate that the copyrighting of a compilation was not intended to preclude others
from using the underlying data: "The most important point here is one that is commonly
misunderstood today, copyright in a 'new version' covers only the material added by the
later author, and has no effect one way or the other on the copyright or public domain status
of the preexisting material." 1976 House Report, supra note 9, at 57; S. REP. No. 473,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1975). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see
William Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts. A Reply, 6 CoMM. & L., Oct. 1984, at
11, 18-25.
20 This is reflected in the copyright registration requirements, which provide that in an
application for copyright registration a compilation work shall include "an identification of
any preexisting work or works that it is based on or incorporates, and a brief, general
11591992]
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Additionally, both compilations and section 102 works are subject to
further statutory provisions that may limit the extent of copyright protection.
The most significant limitation is set forth in section 102(b), which provides,
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 21 This section codifies the
age-old idea/expression dichotomy that copyright protection extends only to the
expression of ideas, but not to the ideas themselves. 22 By explicitly prohibiting
copyright in ideas, facts, or information, section 102(b) insures that the public
will not be deprived of access to these elements, regardless of their
embodiment in a work subject to copyright protection. 23
statement of the additional material covered by the copyright claim being registered." 17
U.S.C. § 409 (1988).
21 Id. § 102(b).
22 The idea/expression dichotomy was explained by the late Register of Copyright
Abraham Kaminste in his 1961 Report on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law:
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed
by the author's work. It pertains to the literary, musical, graphic or artistic form
in which the author expresses intellectual concepts. It enables him to prevent
others from reproducing his individual expression without his consent. But anyone
is free to create his own expression of the same concepts, or to make practical use
of them, as long as he does not copy the author's form of expression.
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE GENERAL REvISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW (July 1961).
23 Section 102(b) is complemented by section 107, which also insures that the public
will not be deprived of access to certain elements regardless of their embodiment in a work
subject to copyright protection. Section 107 codifies the judicially evolved doctrine of "fair
use" which is often defined as the "privilege in others than the owner to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner" without consent, "notwithstanding the monopoly granted
to the owner." Rosemount Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
Although the Copyright Act provides no express definitions of fair use, section 107
establishes that "the fair use of a copyrighted work... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). In determining whether the use made of a work in a
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) [1'he purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work




B. Copyright Fonnalities-Registration, Deposit, and Notice
In addition to being an original work of authorship and fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, there are statutory formalities such as registration,
deposit, and notice24 which must be met. Registration of a copyright claim can
be obtained "at any time during the subsistence of copyright in any published
or unpublished work."25 To register a copyright claim the owner of the
copyright, or of any exclusive right in the work, must file a copyright
registration form with the Copyright Office, 26 pay a registration fee,27 and
deposit a copy of the copyrighted work to be registered with the Copyright
Office.28 Registration, however, is not a condition of copyright protection. 29
Copyright itself arises by operation of law when any original work of
authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which it can be
perceived. 30 Accordingly, copyright protection will exist despite lack of
registration or deposit.
Registration and deposit, , however, do have significant legal
consequences, 31 the most notable being that registration is a jurisdictional
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Although the Eleventh Circuit panel referred to the "fair use"
doctrine, the issue in Cable News Netvork does not involve "fair use" and, therefore, that
subject is beyond the scope of this article.
24 The notice provision must only be complied with by copyright owners who publicly
distributed their work before March 1, 1989. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1988). March 1, 1989,
is the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which eliminated
many of the copyright formalities, such as notice, that existed under the 1976 Act. See
generally The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 (1988).
25 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988).
2 6 See id. § 409.
2 7 See id. § 708.
28 See id. § 407. The function of deposit is to provide the Library of Congress via the
Copyright Office with copies and phonorecords of all works published within the United
States.
29 See id. § 408(a).
30 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
31 In addition to prohibiting the institution of an infringement suit until after
registration, the Act provides several incentives for copyright owners to register their
works. For example, the Act limits statutory damages and attorney's fees to works that are
registered at the time of the infringement unless the work was registered within three
months after the first publication. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 and § 412. Moreover, section 410(c)
of the Act provides that registration, before or within five years after the first publication of
the work, is prima facie evidence of the copyright and of the facts stated in the registration
certificate, including the requirements of originality and susceptibility to copyright under
19921
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requirement and prerequisite to an infringement suit. Under section 411(a),
"[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted
until registration of the copyright claim has been made."32 As Congress
explained this provision:
[R]egistration must be made before a suit for copyright infringement is
instituted. Under the bill, as under the law now in effect, a copyright owner
who has not registered his claim can have a valid cause of action against
someone who has infringed his copyright, but he cannot enforce his right in the
courts until he has made registration.33
III. COPYRIGHT LAW'S TREATMENT OF FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
PRIOR TO CABLE NEws NETWORK
A. Split of Authority: The Proper Rationale for Applying Copyright
Protection to Factual Compilations
Although the Copyright Act of 1976 clearly establishes the copyrightability
of compilations, "copyright law and compilations are uneasy bedfellows." 34
This is because of the undeniable tension between the two well-established
propositions that: facts are not copyrightable but compilations of facts may be.
Recognizing this tension, courts have disagreed as to the appropriate rationale
section 102(a). See, e.g., Donald Frederick Evans & Assoc. v. Continental Homes, Inc.,
785 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1986).
32 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). Section 411(a) specifies two exceptions: (1) For Berne
Convention works, whose country of origin is not the United States; and (2) when
application, deposit, and fee were delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and
registration was refused.
Section 411(b) provides a third exception to the requirement of registration prior to the
institution of an infringement action:
In the case of a work consisting of sounds, images, or both, the first fixation of
which is made simultaneously with its transmission, the copyright owner may,
either before or after such fixation takes place, institute an action for
infringement... if, in accordance with requirements that the Register of
Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, the copyright owner (1) serves notice
upon the infringer, identifying the work and the specific time and source of its first
transmission, and declaring an intention to secure copyright in the work; and (2)
makes registration for the work, if required by subsection (a), within three months
after its first transmission.
Id. § 411(b).
33 1976 House Report, supra note 9, at 57.
34 Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).
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for extending copyright protection to factual compilations and the scope of
protection available to such works.
The disagreement originated to a large extent in the ambiguous language of
the 1909 Copyright Act. The Act, like the Constitution, does not expressly
require that a work be "original" in order to invoke copyright protection.35 As
a result of this omission, a conflict developed among the circuits as to whether
a work must be "original" in order to invoke copyright protection. Several
circuits held originality to be a statutory prerequiste for copyright protection
and, consequently, that copyright protection could extend only to original
works of authorship embodied in a compilation.3 6 Other circuits, however,
held "originality" to be satisfied by the collection of information and data and
subsequently developed their own theory known as the "industrious collection"
or "sweat of the brow" doctrine. 37
Recognizing that the language of the 1909 Act had "led to misconception
about what is copyrightable matter," 38 Congress made explicit the originality
requirement in the Copyright Act of 1976, which specifically provides that
copyright protection subsists in "original works of authorship." 39 The 1976
Act, however, does not include a definition of an "original work of
35 The 1909 Act merely stated that "the works for which copyright may be secured
under this act are all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1909). The 1976 Copyright
Act is the first Copyright Act to expressly require that a work be "original" in order to
invoke copyright protection.
36 Based upon two decisions from the late 19th century in which the Supreme Court
defined "authors" and "writings," the same words used in article I, section 8, clause 8 of
the Constitution, lower courts concluded that the originality requirement was implicitly
incorporated into the 1909 Act. In the first of these decisions, Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court defined "author" in a constitutional
sense, to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker." Id. at 58 (quoting
WORCHESTER'S DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 99 (1897)). The Court
emphasized the creative component of originality and described copyright as being limited
to "original intellectual conceptions of the author." Id.
In the second case, The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1897), the Supreme Court
held that for a particular work to be classified "under the head of writings of authors," that
originality is required and that originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of
creativity. Id. at 94.
Based on these decisions, as one commentator noted, the courts therefore "inferred the
requirement [of originality] from the fact that copyright protection may only be claimed by
'authors'... it was reasoned that since an author is 'the creator, originator' it follows that a
work is not the product of an author unless the work is original." 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.01 (1990 ed.).
37 See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
38 REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 22, at 9.
39 Id.
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authorship." As stated in the House Report accompanying the Act, "[Tihe
phrase is purposefully left undefined and is intended to incorporate without
change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present
[1909] copyright statute." 40 Therefore, the "industrious collection" doctrine
developed by the courts under the 1909 Act continued to be applied in some
jurisdictions under the 1976 Act.
1. The "Industrious Collection" Doctrine
The "industrious collection" doctrine, alternatively known as "sweat of the
brow," bases copyright protection for compilations of factual materials on the
labor expended by the compiler in gathering the facts presented. A compilation
is copyrightable in its entirety, regardless of whether it is devoid of creativity
or contains purely factual information, if it is the product of meaningful effort.
In other words, the labor of the compiler, rather than any particular quality of
the factual compilation, makes a work an "original work of authorship."
The classic formulation of the "industrious collection" doctrine appeared in
Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.,41 in which the
Second Circuit upheld the copyright to a book containing a compilation of
addresses and trademarks of jewelers. Affirming a decision of Judge Learned
Hand,42 the Second Circuit concluded:
The right to copyright a book upon which one has expended labor in its
preparation does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected
consist or not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials
show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or anything
more than industrious collection. The man who goes through the streets of a
town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their
occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is the
author. He produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may
obtain a copyright .... 43
Although the court used the term "author," it is clear that the directory
contained wholly factual information and was void of original thought or
original written expression. The only creativity was in the author's industry or
labor in collecting the material.
40 1976 House Report, supra note 9, at 51.
41 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
42 Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), af'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
43 Jeweler's Crcular, 281 F. at 88.
1164 [Vol. 53:1155
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT
Several circuits subsequently adopted the "industrious collection" standard
of Jeweler's Circular.44 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has taken a strong
position in support of the doctrine,45 as illustrated by perhaps its most notable
case on point, Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.46 In Schroeder, the
plaintiffs sued for an infringement of a copyrighted garden directory that listed
alphabetically the names and addresses of suppliers of items useful to gardeners
which the defendant had incorporated into his own gardening book. Relying on
Jeweler's Circular, the Seventh Circuit found the copying to be impermissible,
stating that "only 'industrious collection,' not originality in the sense of
novelty, is required to find a work copyrightable." 47 The court additionally
concluded that because of the labor expended in compiling the facts any
individual who wished to use the factual material contained in the compilation
had to conduct his or her own independent research.48 This rationale illustrates
an underlying premise of the "industrious collection" doctrine, which is that
one should not freely reap the benefit of the industry of another in reporting
and researching facts. 49 This, according to the "industrious collection"
doctrine, was one of the purposes for the Copyright Acts.
44 This approach was largely adopted by the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. See,
e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990); Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), (finding
telephone white pages copyrightable), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); West Publishing Co.
v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding creative selection in
West's ordering of cases and pagination in case reporters), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070
(1987); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985)
(sufficient authorship of white pages telephone directory established because plaintiff
"solicited, gathered, filed, sorted, and maintained the information").
45 See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding copyrightable telephone directory listings where defendant rearranged entries
according to address and phone number); see also Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v.
Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985) (creation of map using boundary
information from earlier map was copyright infringement). For a discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's application of the "industrious collection" doctrine, see Elizabeth M. Saunders,
Note, Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact: Does the Originality Standard Allow
Protection on the Basis of Industrious Collection?, 62 NoTRE DAME L. RE. 763, 770-74
(1987).
46 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
47 Id. at 5.
48 Id. at 5-6.
49 As one commentator has argued:
The effort of authorship can be effectively encouraged and rewarded only by
linking the existence and extent of protection to the total labor of production. To
focus on the superficial form of the final product to the exclusion of the effort
expended in collecting the data presented in the work is to ignore the central
contribution of the compiler.
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2. The Rejection of the "Industrious Collection" Doctrine
Although some circuits adopted the "industrious collection" doctrine, other
circuits rejected and criticized the doctrine for holding labor per se to be
copyrightable. For example, in Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,50 the
Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the doctrine, finding research to be a form of
factual compiling, and therefore not copyrightable. The trial court in Miller
held that copyright law protected not only the ingenuity involved in giving
expression to facts, but also the effort involved in discovering and exposing
facts-the researcher's labor.S1 Reversing and remanding the trial court's
decision, the Fifth Circuit concluded that copyrightability rests "on the
originality of the selection and arrangement of the factual material, rather than
on the industriousness of the efforts to develop the information." 52 The court
reasoned that protecting the industry involved in gathering facts or other
noncopyrightable material essentially provided copyright protection to that
material itself in violation of a fundamental principle of copyright law.53
The Ninth Circuit, adopting the same reasoning as set forth by the Fifth
Circuit in Miller, reached a similar conclusion in Worth v. Selchow & Righter
C0.54 After citing with approval decisions holding that research or labor per se
is not protected,55 the court concluded that the "Trivial Pursuit" board game
did not infringe upon an encyclopedia of trivia because the defendant game
manufacturer copied only the factual content and not the arrangement or
selection of entries in the encyclopedia. 56 The Worth decision illustrates the
rejection of the premise advocated by the "industrious collection" that every
compiler must begin with an independent canvas. As summarized in a Second
Circuit opinion:
[The courts] cannot subscribe to the view that any author is absolutely
precluded from saving time and effort by referring to and relying upon prior
Robert Denicola, Copyright in Collection of Facts: A 7Thory for the Protection of Nonfiction
Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516 (1981). But see Patry, supra note 19 (reply to
Denicola).
50 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981).
51 Id. at 1369.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1372.
54 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988).
55 827 F.2d at 573-74.
56 Id. at 576.
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published material.... It is just such wasted effort that the proscription
against the copyright of ideas and facts... [is] designed to prevent. 57
So long as the original compiler's selection and arrangement is not used, a
subsequent compiler is free to make use of the information in the original
copyrighted compilation.58 The only materials in the compilation that are not
subject to the use by another are the original elements contributed by the first
compiler. Alternatively stated, a copyright protects the original form, but not
the factual contents of a compilation.
Notwithstanding the existence of this contrary line of authority, represented
by such decisions as Worth and Miller, the "industrious collection" doctrine
remained viable, and the debate continued as to the scope of copyright
protection available to factual compilations.59 As the Supreme Court noted in
1985, "[The law is unsettled regarding the ways in which noncopyrightable
elements combine with an author's original contributions to form protected
expression." 60 In 1991, however, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,61 a unanimous Supreme Court resolved the conflict by
clarifying the extent of copyright protection available to factual compilations.
B. Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.
Feist, perhaps the most important Supreme Court copyright case since the
seminal case of Wheaton v. Peters,62 involved the copyrightability of a
telephone directory's white pages. Feist Publications, a publishing company
that distributes area-wide telephone directories, extracted telephone listings
from Rural's local white pages without Rural's consent. 63 Although Feist hired
57 Rosemount Enter. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
58 See Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
59 The "industrious collection" doctrine has always been the subject of much scholarly
debate. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 49; Patry, supra note 19; Saunders, supra note 45.
60 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
61 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
62 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Wheaton established the bedrock theory of American
Copyright Law: Copyright is the grant of a limited statutory monopoly to benefit the public
interest.
63 Rural Telephone Service Company is a certified public utility company providing
telephone service to several communities in Kansas. Pursuant to state regulation, Rural
publishes a typical telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages. Rural
obtains data for the directory from subscribers, who must provide their names and addresses
to obtain telephone service. Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes
in area-wide telephone directories covering a much larger geographic range than directories
such as Rural's. When Rural refused to license its white page listing to Feist for a directory
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personnel to verify listings out of Rural's white pages and altered many
listings, its final product replicated 1,309 out of approximately 47,000 entries
in Rural's directory, including four "trap entries" inserted by Rural to detect
copying. 64 The issue presented to the Court was whether the copyright in
Rural's directory protected the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by
Feist.
The Court began its opinion by discussing the tension between the
propositions that facts are not copyrightable, whereas a compilation of facts
may be.65 The solution to resolving this tension, the Court held, was first to
recognize why copyright protection does not extend to facts. Facts are not
copyrightable because "the sine qua non of copyright is originality," and "[to
qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author." 66 The
term "original," as used in copyright, the Court defined as "independently
created by the author and possesses a minimal degree of creativity." 67
Although acknowledging that the threshold for originality is low, 68 the Court
held "originality" to be the very premise of copyright, a statutory and
constitutional requirement, and "the bedrock principle of copyright that
mandates the law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual
compilations." 69 Because facts, "whether they be 'scientific, historical,
biographical, or news of the day,' do not owe their origin to an act of
authorship, they are not original in the constitutional sense and, accordingly,
not copyrightable." 70
Because facts, by themselves, are never copyrightable, the Court reasoned
that the component of originality that renders a factual compilation subject to
covering eleven different telephone service areas, Feist extracted the listing it needed from
Rural's directory without Rural's consent. Although Feist altered many of the listings,
several were identical to listings in Rural's white pages. The district court granted summary
judgment to Rural in its copyright infringement suit, holding that telephone directories are
copyrightable. The court of appeals affirmed. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990).
64 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1286 (1991).
Rural had inserted into its directory fictitious listings for the sole purpose of allowing it to
detect copying of listings.
65 Id. at 1287.
66 Id. at 1287 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
547-49 (1985)).
67 Id. at 1287.
68 Id. ("[The vast majority of works make the grade, as they posses some creative
spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be.") (quoting NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 36, at § 1.08 [C] [1] (1990)). "Originality" does not require that facts
be presented in an innovative or surprising way, however, the selection and arrangement of
facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever. Id.
69 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
70 Id. at 1289.
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copyright lies in the arrangement, coordination, and selection of the facts. 7 1
Therefore, "a factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an
original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to the
particular selection or arrangement." 72 It is the original selection and
contribution of the compiler that makes a factual compilation subject to
copyright and "in no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves." 73
The consequence of applying this rationale, as the Court recognized,
"inevitably means that copyright in a factual compilation is thin,"74 because
"copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are
original to the author." 75
After establishing the standard that governs the extent to which copyright
protection can be extended to factual compilations, the Court then proceeded to
explain why the "industrious collection" doctrine was inconsistent with this
standard. The "industrious collection" doctrine was held to have numerous
flaws, "the most glaring being that it extended copyright protection in a
compilation beyond selection and arrangement-the compiler's original
contributions-to the facts themselves." 76 Although acknowledging the possible
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1288-89 (citing Carl Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1868 (1990); L. Ray
Patterson and Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: 77Te Scope of Copyright Protection for
Law Reports & Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 800-02 (1989)).
74 Id. at 1289. As the Court stated:
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the
facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so
long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.
Id.
75 Id. at 1289.
76 Id. at 1291. The Court emphasized the point that copyright protection could only be
extended to the original components of a work by examining the copyright statute's
legislative history which defines the phrase "original works of authorship" by referring to
the originality standard. In addition, the Court cited earlier Supreme Court decisions which
it said made clear that the language of the 1909 Act did not permit the "industrious
collection" approach. Specifically, the Court cited International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), as being the best example of a decision which recognized that
the 1909 Act made clear that the statute did not permit the "sweat of the brow" approach. In
International News Service, Associated Press had conceded taking news reported by
International News Service and publishing it in its own newspapers. Recognizing that
section 5 of the 1909 Act specifically mentioned "periodicals, including newspapers," the
Court acknowledged that news articles were copyrightable. Id. at 234. It flatly rejected,
however, the notion that the copyright in an article extended to the factual information it
contained: "The news element-the information respecting current events contained in the
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unfairness of failure to protect the compiler's labor, the Court viewed the
consequences as neither unfair nor unfortunate, but instead as being "'the
essence of copyright' and a constitutional requirement." 77 "The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the
progress of Science and useful Arts.'" 78 Therefore, fairness to compilers was
simply not an issue and the circuits which had adopted the "industrious
collection" doctrine had simply misunderstood the copyright statute.79
The Court continued its discussion by examining some of the 1976
revisions in the Copyright Act,80 which it determined to be a direct response to
the Copyright Office's concern over some courts' adoption of the "industrious
collection" standard. The Court noted:
The revisions 'explain with painstaking clarity' that copyright requires
originality, § 102(a); that facts are never original, § 102(b); that the copyright
in a compilation does not extend to the facts it contains, § 103(b); and that a
compilation is copyrightable only to the extent that it features an original
selection, coordination, or arrangement, § 101.81
Thus, the 1976 Act left no doubt that originality, not "industrious collection,"
is the touchstone of copyright protection in fact-based works and, consequently,
not every collection of facts receives copyright protection.82 Furthermore,
because not all copying is copyright infringement,83 the Court established that
in an infringement action the copyright owner must establish two elements: (1)
literary production-is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that
ordinarily are publicijuris; it is the history of the day." Id.
77 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
78 Id. (citing U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8); accord Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The Court further stated that rather than requiring
each newcomer to start from scratch, copyright law intends to make available to all the
fruits of previous research. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290.
79 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1299.
80 For example, section 3 of the 1909 Act stated that copyright protected only the
"copyrightable component parts" of a work. The 1976 Act deleted this section and replaced
it with § 102(b) which identifies specifically those elements of a work for which copyright is
not available.
81 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1295 (stating that the 1976 revisions had proven successful in
"steering courts" in the right direction and citing approvingly Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981)). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying
text.
82 Id. at 1294.
83 A person accused of copying may or may not be guilty of violating a copyright.
Although a person who copies the original components of a work may be guilty of
infringement, he or she may not be guilty of infringement if- (1) only unoriginal




ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original. 84
Having completed its attack on the "industrious collection" doctrine, the
Court concluded by addressing the particular facts of the case presented.
Beginning with the proposition that Rural owned a copyright in its telephone
directory as a whole, which included introductory text and graphically laid-out
yellow pages, it was uncontested that Feist had copied a substantial amount of
factual information from Rural's white pages.8 5 Therefore, the issue was
simply whether Rural had proven the second element necessary to establish
infringement-the copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.
Stated another way, the question before the Court was whether the names,
towns, and telephone numbers listed in Rural's telephone white pages were
entitled to copyright protection. Recognizing that nothing Feist had copied
reflected original authorship or "owed its origin" to Rural, the Court concluded
that they were not.86 The raw data making up the telephone directory did not
satisfy the originality requirement and, given that Rural's alphabetical listing
amounted to a "garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the
slightest creativity," 87 the Court held that the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of Rural's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional
standards for copyright protection since "copyright rewards originality, not
effort."88 Accordingly, because Feist had copied only the uncopyrightable data
in Rural's white pages, Feist's use of the listings could not constitute
infringement. 89
84 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296. This is contrary to many courts' contention that to succeed
in a copyright infringement action, a plaintiff must prove ownership of the copyright and
copying by the defendant. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
85 It is interesting to note that the issue as to whether such copying included the
selection and arrangement of the material was not addressed. Presumably, because Feist
copied the entirety of the material, Feist would have been held to have copied the
arrangement.
86 Feist, 11 S. Ct. at 1296.
87 Id. at 1296 (noting that although Rural's arrangement may, technically speaking,
owe its origin to Rural and that no one disputes that Rural undertook the task of
alphabetizing the names itself, there is nothing remotely creative about arranging names
alphabetically in a white pages directory).
88 Id. at 1297.
89 Id.
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IV. CABLE NEWS NETWORK v VIDEO MONITORING SERVICES
A. The Procedural History
Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Services was initiated on
November 23, 1988 when Cable News Network (CNN)90 claimed ownership
of a copyright in a certain thirty-minute television broadcast, "Crossfire," that
Video Monitoring Services (VMS)91 had copied and sold.92 CNN brought a
copyright infringement suit against VMS stating that it was "entitled, pursuant
to section 502 [of the Copyright Act] to injunctive relief to prevent VMS from
selling or otherwise distributing videotapes, transcripts, or other copies, in any
form, of any of CNN's programming, or any part or portion thereof, and from
otherwise infringing any copyright interest of CNN."93 The district court
granted CNN a preliminary injunction enjoining VMS from "copying or selling
copies of any of CNN's programming."94
On February 21, 1990, VMS filed a motion to clarify and amend the
judgment stating that "the injunction language proposed by CNN was improper
and overbroad because it prohibits far more activity that [sic] allegedly
infringes CNN's copyrights." 95 Following the district court's denial of VMS's
motion to clarify and amend the judgment, VMS filed an interlocutory appeal
90 Cable News Network (CNN) is in the business of producing news reports which are
broadcast and distributed via satellite to viewers throughout the United States and
approximately sixty-five foreign countries. The programming at the domestic level is
composed of two distinct presentations. The first, known as "Cable News Network,"
provides comprehensive up-to-the-minute coverage of domestic and international news,
sports, business, and weather. The second programming service offered by CNN is known
as "Headline News," which provides a more concise version of the basic coverage on a
periodic cycle. Additionally, CNN programming consists of supplemental broadcasts
embracing a variety of special programming covering various topics. Included in this
category is the program "Crossfire."
91 Video Monitoring Services (VMS) is a national video monitoring service that
monitors television programming nationwide, including CNN's, and provides copies of
program segments and other information requested by its clients. During 1988, VMS's New
York office recorded approximately $300,000 in sales.
92 Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, 1474 (11th Cir.),
vacated and reh'g granted, 949 F.2d 378 (1lth Cir. 1991) (en bane), appeal dismissed, 959
F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992) (en bane). CNN had filed with the Copyright Office and received
a certificate of registration for the thirty-minute segment, "Crossfire." The court presumed
that employees of CNN recorded the sounds and images which constituted the broadcast of
the segment, thereby conferring "authorship" status of CNN by operation of law. Id. at
1475 n.5.
93 Id. at 1475.




to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 4, 1991, the Eleventh
Circuit panel entered its decision in Cable News Network, reversing and
remanding the preliminary injunction and the subsequent denial of VMS's
motion to clarify and amend. 96
B. The Issues Presented
The question presented on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit panel was
whether the preliminary injunction granted by the district court was
inconsistent with the law of copyright. Specifically, the injunction raised two
issues. First, was the scope of the injunction overbroad in that it prevented
VMS from copying (a) unregistered copyrighted claims in existing works and
(b) future transmission programming yet to be created? Second, was the scope
of the injunction contrary to the teachings of Feist in that it indiscriminately
prohibited the copying of "any part" of CNN's news broadcast in the absence
of proof that each and every element of the newscast constituted original,
creative authorship?
C. Analysis of the Case
1. Scope of the Injunction: Was it Overbroad and Inconsistent
with the Law of Copyright?
The power for any court to grant injunctive relief springs from section 502
(a) which provides: "Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising
under this title may... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as
it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright."97
The operative words are "having jurisdiction" and "copyright," 98 and, as the
panel recognized, before a court can have jurisdiction to entertain an
infringement action, the prior registration requirements of section 411 must be
met.99 Furthermore, the scope of the remedy for copyright infringement is
constrained and dictated by the scope of the copyright claim actually registered.
In this case, CNN did not undertake to register its claim of copyright in the
broadcast day on which the copyrighted segment of "Crossfire" appeared, or
for that week, month, or year.'OO Moreover, by CNN's own admission, the
96 Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir.),
vacated and reh'g granted, 949 F.2d 378 (1 lth Cir. 1991) (en bane), appeal dismissed, 959
F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
97 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
98 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1480.
99 See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
100 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1480.
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program is not the usual news, sports, or weather broadcast reporting that
constitutes the bulk of CNN's 24-hour-a-day transmission programming.101
Nevertheless, the district court entered the injunction enjoining VMS from
"copying or selling copies of any of CNN's programming."102 As the panel
concluded, such relief assumes that one can enforce a remedy for infringement
of: (1) unregistered claims of copyright in unpublished works; and (2) putative
copyrights in works that are not yet in existence. Although the panel
determined both to be manifestly contrary to the basic concepts of copyright
law, it addressed the validity of each separately, beginning with the future
works theory.
a. Propriety of Affording Injunctive Relieffor the Infringement of Future
Works
Even though recognizing that a court may enjoin the future infringement of
copyrighted works in certain instances, 103 the panel concluded that copying of
future works that are yet to be created could not be enjoined.104 Part of the
panel's reasoning was grounded in the theory that because a "future work," by
definition, has not yet been created, it cannot be "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression."105 Without fixation, there can be no copyright protection because
"[c]opyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in a
101 Id.
1O2 Id. at 1476 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 1481. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F.
Supp. 1156, 1187-88 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (enjoining "infringement of future registered
works"); Orth-O-Vision v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(same); cf Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (relying on
Britannica and Orth-O-Vision to impose injunction on use of plaintiff's existing cartoon
characters similar to the registered ones at issue).
104 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1481. This is because Congress in the 1976
Copyright Act requires the registration of a work in order to obtain a remedy for copyright
infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text. This
limitation, of course, is ignored by a permanent injunction protecting fiture works.
The only time an injunction against future unregistered works has been granted was in
National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). This
case concerned the unique circumstance of repeated interception of satellite broadcasts of
professional football games which, unlike newscasts, consists entirely of special unscripted
live events. Because these events were "spontaneous," section 411(b) was created to make
available an infringement remedy to a "live" broadcast yet to be "fixed." 1976 House
Report, supra note 9, at 57. Even under this limited and narrow procedure, however,
registration has to be accomplished within three months of the work's transmission. CNN
provided no such notice.
105 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1481. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying
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tangible medium of expression."1 6 The panel found further support for its
conclusion-that relief can be granted only for extant copyright-in section
501(a), which provides: "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner... is an infringer of the copyright." 0 7 Accordingly,
until there is a copyright, there cannot be a copyright owner, and section
501(b) limits an action for infringement to acts that occur while one is the
owner.108 A copyright injunction thus can only be granted to protect the
statutory rights of a copyright owner, in contrast to would-be authors who are
not entitled to copyright protection. Therefore, the Cable News Network district
court did not have jurisdiction enabling it to extend to CNN a copyright
injunction.
In addition to challenging the district court's jurisdiction to issue the
injunction, the Eleventh Circuit panel also held that any injunction restraining
the copying of a class of future works would be antithetical to the holding in
Feist.109 The injunction clearly afforded generic protection to all of CNN's
television news broadcasts, regardless of their satisfaction of the constitutional
and statutory requirement of originality as interpreted in Feist.ll0 In prior
106 Id.
107 Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
108 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1481. Section 501(b) provides in pertinent part:
"The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled... to
institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is
the owner of it." 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988).
109 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1481.
110 A permanent injunction relieves CNN of the burden of either complying with or
proving the originality requirement. The result is that CNN would receive copyright
protection to which it may not be entitled, i.e., not because all the components of the works
are original, but because the works themselves are created by hard work. The panel also
noted that an injunction that restrains the copying of a class of future works not yet created
enables copyright claimants to avoid registration which the panel determined serves to
maintain the copyright monopoly within the context of the promotion of learning, by
assuring access to even unpublished works because the deposit is open to the public. Cable
News Network, 940 F.2d at 1481.
It is apparent that the Constitution does not permit, and the Copyright Act does not
provide for generic copyright protection for future works. Thus, Congress can provide
copyright only for the writings an author has produced, not for writings that the author
intends to produce.
Although the Copyright Act does not provide for an injunction to enjoin the
infringement of future works, the copyright owner of a future original work is by no means
remediless if that work is infringed. "The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright
with a potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer." Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 438 (1984). The availability of statutory damages under 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988), as well as the court's power to impound and to destroy
infringing copies and "articles by means of which [infringing] copies or phonorecords may
be reproduced," id. § 503(a) and (b), and to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party,
117519921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
copyright infringement cases similar to Cable News Network, courts, including
the Eleventh Circuit, held the originality of newscasts to be beyond dispute
based on the premise that "editorial judgment used to present effectively the
events covered by the broadcast made it an 'original work of authorship.'""'
Feist, however, undermines this assumption and mandates that in each instance
a determination be made whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement
are sufficiently original to merit protection. As the panel decision noted, it
cannot be assumed that after Feist every newscast will qualify for compilation
copyright status. 1' 2 Furthermore, affording protection to works, that may or
may not be copyrightable, can clearly not be based on some "equitable"
concept granting protection to the efforts of an author." 3 As the panel
concluded, Feist not only rejected the "industrious collection" doctrine, but
also the notion that allowing free copying of facts was in any way "unfair" or
"unfortunate.""14
b. Propriety of Affording Injunctive Relief for the Infringement of
Unregistered Copyrights in Existing Works
Although the panel acknowledged CNN's contention that the Eleventh
Circuit had approved of affording injunctive relief for the infringement of
id. § 505, are arguably sufficient deterrents to the infringement of future works.
Additionally, "any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of
commercial advantage or private gain" may be prosecuted for a criminal offense. Id. § 506.
ll1 See, e.g., Georgia Television v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, 718 F. Supp. 939
(N.D. Ga. 1989); KCNC-TV v. Broadcast Info. Servs., Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Colo.
1988); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1004 (1985), on remand, 618 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 1985), afd, 792 F.2d
1013 (11th Cir. 1986).
112 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1485 n.23. As established by Feist,
[N]ot every selection, coordination, or arrangement will pass muster. To merit
protection, the facts must be selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way to
render the work as a whole original. This implies that some 'ways' will trigger
copyright, but that others will not.
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Ptry, supra note 19, at 57). Accordingly, in light of Feist,
a court could find a news broadcast not susceptible to copyright protection, regardless of the
time expended by the network employees in compiling the materials.
113 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1481 ("Feist overrules the 'industrious
collection' or 'sweat of the brow' line of cases precisely because those cases
indiscriminately afforded copyright protection against any and all copying of all or any part
of a compilation.")
114 Id. (citing Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290).
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unregistered copyrights in existing works in a previous decision,115 it noted
that such relief would render meaningless the substantive provisions of section
411(a) and, in any case, was clearly contrary to the teachings of Feist.116 The
panel reiterated that a copyright owner's compliance with section 411 is a
prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of the federal district court and
pursuing any remedy for infringement. 117 The dichotomy between copyright
protection and remedy, the panel held, was apparent from the statutory
language and legislative history accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act.118
Furthermore, sections of the Congressional Committee Report that focused on
the registration requirement before the passage of the Beme Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 indicates that registration is still in the public
interest and therefore section 411(a)-and registration as a prerequisite to the
filing of an infringement suit-should remain.119 Additionally, the Report
reflects concern that abolition of the registration requirement would "result in
attempts to use the legal system to exert control over materials that Congress
115 In Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh
Circuit was presented with a copyright infringement case in which the district court had
declined to afford injunctive relief to the copyright owner. Although the scope of an
injunction was never at issue, in a footnote the court indicated the district court had
the power to issue [an injunction against the use of unregistered works] because
the statute provides for injunctions to prevent infringement of a 'copyright' not
necessarily the registered copyright that gave rise to the infringement
action.... To refuse injunctive relief under these conditions would render
meaningless the fact that registration is 'not a condition of copyright protection.'
17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1977).
Id. at 1499 n. 17. To the extent that CNN sought to rely upon the language of this footnote,
the panel noted that the language is manifestly obiter dicta and that Cable News Network
was clearly distinguishable from Pacific & Southern.
Furthermore, the panel noted that "since the [Pacific & Southern] opinion the Supreme
Court [in Feist] had addressed and clarified the law of copyright and thereby removed any
doubt concerning the appropriate scope of injunctive relief that may have been suggested by
Pacific & Southern." Id. at 1477.
116 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1482-83.
117 Id. at 1482.
I18 Id.
119 H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1988) (concluding that
registration promotes efficient litigation practices, narrows the issues that must be litigated
and, because it pertains to proof of ownership, assists the courts in resolving the underlying
copyright dispute). For an extensive discussion on the legislative debate, see NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 36, at § 7.16 [B][1][6].
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intended to be in the public domain." 120 This concern was clearly realized in
Cable News Network.121
As the panel recognized, the protection of CNN's news broadcasts by the
injunction was contrary to the scheme of the Copyright Act because it
eliminated both the need for originality in the protected works, and the means
of assuring a work's existence-registration. Although an issue of fact,
registration is also a constitutional requirement and its presence cannot be
determined by inference or conjecture.122 Furthermore, without registration
there can be no assurance that copyright will be limited to "original intellectual
conceptions of the author," as the Constitution mandates. By enjoining VMS
from copying unregistered works, the district court in this case simply failed to
recognize that the only way to ensure that a copyright claimant, such as CNN,
fulfills the constitutional requirement of original authorship is to grant relief
only in accordance with the copyright registration. Recognizing this failure, the
panel properly held that CNN, like all copyright holders, must comply with the
deposit and registration system before it can enforce copyrights in its news
broadcasts.1 23
120 H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1988).
121 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1483.
122 By trying to protect all of the material in its broadcast day without proper
registration, CNN precluded any analysis of originality or fair use with respect to the
material it used, thereby preventing the district court from "fashion[ing] an injunctive
remedy that balanced the copyright owner's rights fairly against the rights of the public."
Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1479. If CNN had registered its copyright claim in a
typical broadcast day, its registration application would have had to identify those
uncopyrightable elements. See supra note 20.
Furthermore, relieving CNN of the statutory duty of registration as a condition for the
protection of future works enables CNN to defeat the constitutional purpose of promoting
learning, because the injunction allows CNN to prevent a news monitor from copying off-
the-air its future fact-based newscasts that may be destroyed shortly after they are performed
over the public airwaves.
123 The panel further noted that even if CNN had undertaken registration of its claim
of copyright in a typical broadcast day, the scope of the injunctive relief afforded by the
district court would remain overbroad. As the panel recognized, "Copyright protection has
never accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible use of his work."
Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1484 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 433 (1984)). Arguably, VMS's use of some of the material contained in CNN's
news broadcasts would constitute "fair use" and thus not an infringement of copyright. See
supra note 23. An injunction, however, precluding VMS from copying CNN's material in
whole or in part, clearly robs VMS of the fair use defense, and accords CNN complete
control over the use of its news broadcasts. As the panel concluded: "By approving a grant
of injunctive relief for infringement of unregistered, copyrighted transmission programs,
[the court] would allow broadcasters to close the door on public access to their work
product." Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1484. Furthermore, the panel recognized that
in an age when the broadcast media represents the source of news for so many citizens,
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2. The Scope of the Injunction: Was it Contrary to the Teachings of
Feist?
Recognizing a television news broadcast to be a compilation consisting of
preexisting, collected, and assembled materials that are factual in nature, the
panel correctly reasoned that only the arrangement and selection of these
materials makes the newscast as "a whole an original work of collective
authorship copyrightable only as a compilation." 124 Therefore, "the teachings
of Feist, as to the scope of copyright protection for compilations, governed the
case to the extent that the district court sought to afford protection to such
newscasts."125
Relying on the language of Feist, the panel reiterated the importance of
originality as the sine qua non of copyright protection, and recognized that pre-
existing, collected, and assembled factual materials incorporated into any news
broadcast are never copyrightable. Therefore, if CNN had registered its news
programming, the scope of the copyright could only extend to the newscast
itself, as distinguished from the substance of the information contained in the
news report. Feist leaves no doubt that "facts, whether they be 'scientific,
historical, biographical, or the news of the day' do not trigger copyright
because they are not 'original' in the constitutional sense." 126 Accordingly,
copyright protection can not extend to the news events, facts, or ideas that
CNN incorporates into its news broadcasts. This material is not copyrightable,
but rather a part of the public domain available to all, including VMS and, as
established in Feist, the copying of public domain material is not only not
copyright infringement, it is the exercise of a constitutional right.127
Furthermore, copyright in a compilation does not extend to any pre-
existing material incorporated into the compilation. As set forth in section
103(b), "The copyright in a compilation.., extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the pre-existing
material employed in the work and does not imply any exclusive right in the
pre-existing material." 12 8 Feist reiterates that copyright protects only those
constituent elements of a work that are actually shown to be creatively original
to the compilation authors: "[T]his is the point of section 103."129
thoughtful consideration must be afforded to the public interest, and courts "must exercise
great care when fashioning injunctive relief in the copyright arena." Id.
124 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1485.
125 Id.
126 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (1991).
127 Id. at 1290.
128 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1486 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988)); see
supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
129 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
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As a matter of copyright law, much of the material in CNN's news
broadcasts is not authored by CNN. The newscasts, as collective works,
contain preexisting material, such as video news releases and commercials, that
are separate contributions created outside of CNN's studio. Because "copyright
in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in
the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the
contribution,"' 3 0 CNN is not entitled to copyright protection for the portion of
its newscasts of which it is not the author. For example, CNN could not claim
copyright in the amateur photographer's videotape of the Los Angeles police
beating a motorist even if it broadcasts the video with permission. Similarly,
CNN does not own clips of Congressional hearings or Presidential press
conferences, or the commercials that interrupt its programming. 131
The Cable News Network district court, however, clearly ignored this fact.
The injunction it provided to CNN protected all of CNN's newscasts from
being copied at any time, for any purpose, without regard to the authorship of
the contents. This type of injunction granted CNN a copyright per se, which
Feist directly forbidsl32 and is inconsistent with the provisions in the 1976
Copyright Act. 133
130 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988). Section 201(c) additionally provides:
In the absence of any express transfer of copyright the owner of copyright in the
collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing
and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, and any
later collective work in the same series.
Id.
131 A substantial portion of VMS's business involves recording television broadcasts so
that it can monitor television advertising. Many of the copyright owners of the commercials
run by CNN retain VMS to monitor CNN to ensure that the network properly aired their
material. In monitoring broadcasts for such commercials, VMS provides its clients with
written reports of the timing and placement of the advertisement, something that cannot
feasibly be done by viewing broadcasts "live."
132 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1293 (compilations not copyrightable per se). Copyright per se
means that a work is given copyright protection merely because it exists, not because it
conforms to any constitutional or statutory conditions. The "industrious collection" doctrine,
of course, results in copyright per se because its test is not the characteristics of the work,
but the effort of the compiler.
133 The permanent injunction relieves CNN of any duty to comply with any provisions
of the Copyright Act as to its future newscasts by:
(1) not mandating that CNN create original works, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988); (2)
enabling CNN to destroy the works systematically (and immediately after its use
of them) with impunity, although the policy is that copyrighted works go into the
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Although not discussed in the panel's decision, the injunction is
additionally contrary to a further principle established in Feist. Feist makes it
clear that in order to establish infringement, the copyright owner must prove
the copying of constituent elements that are original.134 CNN, as the copyright
owner, would have the burden of proving that VMS had copied particular
material of which CNN was the author. Because CNN could not know the
future of its newscasts and, as a result, would be unable to fulfill this
requirement, a reasonable inference is that CNN did not have a right to enjoin
the copying of future works it had not yet created.
V. THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK PANEL DECISIoN, FEIST, AND
COPYRIGHT COMPILATION
The significance of the Cable News Network panel decision to copyright
law's treatment of compilations is substantial. Although ultimately vacated, the
decision will likely serve as the focal point of debate over the proper scope of
copyright protection for factual compilations for years to come. Even though
the decision purported, on its face, to address only the scope of copyright
protection available for CNN's news broadcasts, the panel's rationale and
application of Feist can be extended to all copyright compilations.
Notwithstanding the fact that Feist dealt with telephone directory white pages
and Cable News Network dealt with television newscasts, both media are
compilations. That a television newscast arguably entails more authorship than
"the garden variety white pages directory" does not alter its status as a
compilation, nor does it remove television news broadcasts from the rulings of
Feist. The basic point of Feist-which is applicable to all works-is that
"copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are
original to the author." 135 The logical extension of this is the basic point of the
panel's decision: an injunction that indiscriminately prohibits the copying of a
compilation, without regard to the authorship of the contents, is inconsistent
with the law of copyright. The effects of allowing the type of permanent
injunction issued against VMS are: (1) that a compilation copyright owner is
public domain at the end of the copyrighted term, id. § 302(c); and (3) excusing
CNN from making a deposit of the works with the Library of Congress.
Id. § 407.
Yet the injunction enables CNN to enjoy every benefit the Copyright Act confers.
Furthermore, this type of injunction would deprive an accused infringer of defenses that
would otherwise be available. For example, normally a defendant in a copyright
infringement action can defend for lack of original authorship, lack of registration, fair use,
or lack of ownership.
134 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296.
135 Id. at 1289.
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entitled to per se copyright for its fact-based works; (2) that a compilation
copyright owner is entitled to a per se remedy for copyright infringement in the
form of a permanent injunction; and (3) that a permanent injunction may
protect uncopyrightable material contained in future works. As Feist makes
clear, all three premises are contrary to both the Constitution and the Copyright
Act of 1976.
VI. THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK PANEL'S APPROACH: A REFLECION
OF COPYRIGHT'S CHANGING LANDSCAPE
The importance of the panel's approach extends beyond the proper
treatment of copyright compilations. The panel's reasoning represents a shift in
the paradigm governing copyright law. As the panel noted, copyright by nature
has two aspects, one proprietary and the other regulatory:
Copyright's basis as a proprietary concept is that it enables one to protect his or
her own creations. Its regulatory basis is that when these creations constitute
the expression of ideas presented to the public, they become part of the stream
of information whose unimpeded flow is critical to a free society.136
This dual nature of copyright has produced differing views as to whether
copyright is essentially a proprietary or a regulatory concept. If held to be a
regulatory concept, copyright is a limited statutory monopoly granted to
authors for the public benefit.137 In the alternative, if viewed as a proprietary
concept, copyright is held to be a natural law property right of the author by
reason of his or her creation. 138 In recent years, courts have tended to approach
copyright conflicts from a proprietary premise and interpreted the function of
copyright to be the protection of the author's property rights and economic
interests, to "protect authors against those who would pilfer their work." 139
136 Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Servs., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478 (11th
Cir.) (quoting L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1, 5 (1987)), vacated and reh'g granted, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991) (en bane), appeal
dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (lth Cir. 1992) (en bane).
137 See, e.g, Patterson, supra note 136.
138 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J 517 (1990).
13 9 L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, A
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 2 (1991) (quoting a recent article in NEVSwEEK that asserted
confidently that "the primary purpose of copyright law is to protect the authors against those
who would pilfer their work").
Presumably the courts have adopted this approach because they are concerned with
equity as between the litigants and the equity is most often in favor of the copyright owner.
See Patterson, supra note 136, at 5. Additionally, as the CN decision alluded to, new
communication technology, for example television, has led to an expansion of the
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Feist, however, clearly establishes that this is not the intended purpose of
copyright. Rather, the constitutionally-ordained purpose set forth in the
copyright clause of the Constitution, "is not to reward the labor of the author,
but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts."' 140 Thus, as the
language in Feist indicates, copyright cannot be viewed as a property right of
the author, but rather must be viewed as a statutorily defined right, granted by
the Copyright Act-an Act that limits and precisely defines the scope of rights
it confers.14'
The panel decision clearly reflected a recognition that "Feist mandates a
shift from the traditional [proprietary] approach to copyright conflicts" and
"compels examination of copyright issues.., also from a regulatory
perspective."'142 The panel's analysis of the conflict indicates an understanding
that the scope of copyright protection that could extend to CNN was dictated
not by precedent established in pre-Feist cases, but rather by the basic
principles of copyright law as defined in the 1976 Copyright Act. This is the
type of analysis mandated by Feist and, as such, should be the approach that
future courts adopt. Therefore, the panel's analysis of the issues and its
interpretation of the principles codified in the 1976 Act ultimately may serve as
an analytical foundation for future courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Caught in the crossfire between CNN and VMS, the Eleventh Circuit panel
adopted a holding directly challenging prevailing copyright doctrine. In doing
so, the panel articulated a conceptual framework of copyright as a regulatory
mechanism rather than one establishing a property right in gross to an author's
work. Although ultimately rendered moot by the Eleventh Circuit's en banc
dismissal of the defendant's appeal, the panel's rationale is not only likely to be
controversial in the narrow inquiry of the copyrightability of factual
proprietary premise. See Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1478; see also PATrERSON &
LINDBERG, at 11. ("This modem trend [of courts tending toward the proprietary premise]
can be accounted for in part historically, since the application of copyright to any
technology has generally led to an expansion of the proprietary premise.").
140 Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2).
141 For example, as previously discussed, section 102(a), provides copyright protection
only for original works of authorship; section 102(b) denies copyright protection to ideas;
section 103(b) limits copyright protection for derivative works and compilations. See supra
notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
142 Cable News Network, 940 F.2d at 1478. The panel approached the conflict from
both the proprietary and regulatory perspective. By adopting this approach the panel hoped
"to arrive at a balance between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment that
harmonized the underlying concerns of the founding fathers embodied in our constitutional
legacy." Id.
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compilations but also is likely to be a harbinger of debate over the very nature
of copyright itself.
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